Class Formation and ‘Antediluvian’ Capital in Bangladesh by Wood, Geof
Class Formation and 'Antediluvian' Capital
in Bangladesh*
Geof Wood
Published data on rural class differentiation in
Bangladesh is underdeveloped and inhibits
elaborate description. This is partly because most
of the research was conducted until recently by
the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development
at Comilla (Blair 1974: 122; Van Schondel 1976)
and has been based on agro-economic surveys in
the densely populated and fertile region of
Comilla itself. The Comilla findings formed the
basis of extrapolations for Bangladesh as a whole,
providing an ¡mage of a homogenous agrarian
structure described in terms of small-holding
farmers. Thus an overall consideration of the
land distribution and tenure data on Bangladesh
in the 1960s threw up two misleading generalisa-
tions: the absence of a substantial class of land-
lords and landholders; and the low level of
absolute average size holding. From this data
it is usually concluded that "the rural economy
of Bangladesh is best described as a peasant
economy based on small family farms operated
primarily with family labour" (e.g. Abdullah and
Nations, 1974: 9; also Bose, 1973). The Comilla
cooperative programme was predicated ort the
ideological assumption that class division within
the 'peasant economy' was structurally insig-
nificant.
More recently this view has been modified by
reognising a critical distinction between 'surplus'
peasants on the one hand and subsistence, below
subsistence and landless on the other: i.e., that
minor variations of landholding were nevertheless
critical (Abdullah and Nations 1974; Bertocci
1972). In this view, and along with many
subsequent evaluations of the Comilla coopera-
tive strategy (Khan 1971), there are rural elites
in Bangladeshbut their existence is explained
largely in terms of traditionally strong lineages
hich have managed to dominate the coopera-
tives, new irrigation opportunities, fertiliser
distribution through political connections with
government officals. By such means rural elites
have marginally extended their controt over land.
However, there is the related notion that these
* This paper is based on a longer draft containing additionaldescriptive material and statistics and entitled 'The Nature
of Rural Class Diff.rentiation in Bangladesh', which was
presented to the Peasant Seminar, Centre of International
and Area Studies, University of London in June, 1977.
elites do not constitute a class, since the division
of the holding between sons ensures a process of
cyclical mobility, or, indeed, 'cyclical Kulakism'
(Bertocci 1972.) Differenìiation in this perspective
is analysed as stratification ('objective' categories
of wealth, income and status through which
actors move up and down) rather than with a
focus on the social relations of production and
exchange.
The leftist groups in Bangladesh (see Maniruz-
zarnan 1975) analyse its class structure differently,
but they are divided by fundamentally opposed
positions. Some groups like the East Pakistan
Communist Party of East Bengal, describe social
relations in the countryside as being feudal or
semi-feudal. In particular they focus on the
issues of sharecropping and bonded labour,
pointing to the classes of landlords which remain
significant in the North and West regions of the
country. Elsewhere, even in the densely populated
Dacca-Comilla region (including Noakhali)
sharecropping is still an important component
of many of the small farms. The Jatiyo
Samajtrantrik Dal (JSD. the Revolutionary
Socialist Party) on the other hand argues that the
rural economy is becoming pervasively capitalist.
In particular it evaluated the impact of dominant
capital from the Western wing of Pakistan (hence
its tactical support for 'liberation'); emphasized
the polarisation of landholding which was
disguised by the aggregated national statistics;
and demonstrated the way in which agricultural
programmes in Bangladesh (and, before 1971, in
Pakistan) were big-farmer oriented, especially
when the Comilla strategy is extended into other,
more differentiated, regions.
A refinement of the JSD position is in order.
In the specific circumstances of the partition of
Bengal in 1947 and the colonial domination of
East Bengal by West Pakistan with the related
restrictions on Bengali capital accumulation, the
formal destruction of the landlord-tenant system
did not bring about the development of capitalist
relations of production in the countryside.
Instead other forms of capital were released-
moneylending, trading, petty leasingwhich
characterised the relations between different
classes of Muslims, after Hindu landlords and
moneylenders departed. It is through these
relationships that the polarisation of classes is
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occurring, even under the 'minifundist' agrarian
conditions of the Dacca-Comilla region. The
development of these relations pre-dates the
government strategies of intensifying the level of
capital in agricultural production, thereby
structuring the impact of these strategies away
from the creation of capitalist production
relations. Thus the process of class differentiation
in Bangladesh is the development of usurious and
exploitative relations in the sphere of exchange
rather than in the sphere of production per se.
It is another question whether these relations are
a temporary phase of early accumulation destined
to transform the social formation into native
capitalism (Chattopadhyay 1972); or whether they
are bound to persist and start the development
of capitalist relations in Bangladesh (Patnaik
1972; Alavi 1975).
However, the development of these antediluvian
relations is not a uniform phenomenon
throughout all the regions of Bangladesh, and it
is the existence of significant regional variations
in the relations between classes which is perhaps
responsible for the contradictory views of rural
class differentiation, noted above. In particular
the regions in the North and West of the country
are characterised by a greater differentiation in
landholding, larger landlords, no sharecroppers
and higher landlessness. This pattern is associated
with both specific historical conditions and lower
density of rural population than in the eastern
regions of the country. Thus while a general
picture of antediluvian capital prevails, the
precise fornis of that capital and its effects vary-
more petty leasing in the North and West, more
usury and petty commodity exchange in the East.
Under British rule the province of Bengal was a
'Permanently Settled' area, where most of the
land was divided among za,nindarsa hereditary
class of tax farmers and 'super landlords' taken
over by the British from the declining Mughal
empire during the eighteenth century. The culti-
vator with permanent occupancy rights was a
raiyat, and he in turn might rent out all or part
of his land to under-raiyats or sharecroppers.
Between the zwnindar and the raiyat, a class of
intermediaries or tenure-holders proliferated as
zainindars sub-divided the rent-collecting func-
tions. Apart from the State, then, the classes
variously connected with the land were:
zainindars, raiyats, under-raiyats, sharecroppers
and landless labourers. Sharecroppers and land-
less labourers were the main classes of labour on
the land with raiyats occupying the structural
position of aggregating the surplus from sub-
tenants and labour and transmitting it upwards
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in the form of rent. This zamindar system was
formally abolished in 1950 by the East Bengal
State Acquisition Act, although the partition of
India in 1947 had already undermined some of
its features. The pervasiveness of the system, and
therefore its structural importance for the social
formation after 1950, is demonstrated by noting
that in pre-partition East Bengal, out of a total
of 28.8 mn acres, approximately 18 mn acres
were held by raiyats and a further 2 mn held
directly by under-raiyats, i.e., approximately 70 per
cent.
Land Revenue Commission reports in the 1940s
reveal regional variations in the structure of rural
social relations which undermine the assumptions
of homogeneity based on national level averages
which comprise the more recently published data
on landholdings. They show that the districts in
the North and West of East Bengal were
distinguished from elsewhere in the province by
greater proportions of sharecroppers and landless,
and that the classes of ralyats and tenants were
more differentiated by size of landholding. In those
reports there are descriptions of Muslim jotedars
(petty landlords/rich raiyats). This lends weight
to the proposition that there were Muslim
'surplus' farmers before and during the emergence
of Pakistan in certaïn areas of East Bengal, as
against the more familiar notion that these
classes developed all over East Bengal solely as
a result of West Pakistan colonial policy or in
response to the opportunities created by Comilla-
type agricultural development strategies.
An explanation for this regional variation in the
extent of differentiation among the raiyar classes
must in part refer to the historical specificity of
the 'border' districts during the 1940s. These
districts were more exposed to communal tension
which developed as a prelude to the Muslim
League's campaign for a separate Islamic State.
This communal factor restrained the excesses of
(Hindu) zamindar oppression over Muslim
tenants (e.g., illegal charges in addition to statutory
rent), thus retaining more surplus at the level of
raiyat for accumulation and consolidation of
holdings. Also, as the rural population in border
districts was more evenly distributed between
Hindus and Muslims than elsewhere in the
province, the impact of inter-caste relations on
the pattern of landholding and tenancy was
greater. And after 1947, the departure of Hindu
raiyals as well as zainindars and tenure holders
created more 'illegal' opportunities than further
east for the remaining rich M uslim peasants to
expropriate the land vacated by the Hindu raiyats
as well as landlords. As a result, in this region,
which in any case received the greater proportion
of new immigrants. the newcomers became
sharecroppers and landless labourers rather than
raiyats more frequently than elsewhere.
The proposition is important for several reasons.
First, it indicates a structure of rural class
relations very different from the 'Comilla' model
which is generally appliednamely a homogenous
structure of undifferentiated, small-holding
peasants. Second, it undermines the related
assumptions about the nature of power in East
Bengal which has traditionally been analysed
solely in terms of the aspirations of an urban
petty-bourgeoisie leading an undifferentiated mass
of the peásantry against the common oppressor
from the Weste.g. the language movements and
the rise of Bengali nationalism (Alavi 1972;
Ahmed 1973: 419-48; Ah 1975; Maniruzzaman
1975). More specifically it focuses our attention
on the role of these classes in transforming the
entire social formation both through their
support for the Muslim League and the quest for
an independent Pakistan, and through their
subsequent influence over agrarian legislation and
state policy in agriculture. The Muslim League's
policy of partition had the related advantage of
removing the stratum of Hindu landlords from
their stultifying influence over the aspirations of
the Muslim jotedars; while the attack on feudal
rural relations had to be contained at the point
when the conditions for their own appropriation
of land and surplus had been fulfilled.
However the political significance of this class of
Muslim jotedars in the North and West of
Bangladesh can only be considered in conjunction
with that of the Bengali petty bourgeoisie
consisting of small traders, shopkeepers, profes-
sionals, teachers, junior officials and clerks in the
provincial services. In a country where the entire
urban population was never more than 10 per
cent, this class had close kinship and other
connections with the economically stronger
classes of raiyats and jotedars in the countryside.
It is not difficult therefore to see the relationships
beween the frustrated aspirations of a Bengali
petty bourgeoisie whose language (and career
prospects) was threatened and those of the larger
Muslim farmers and peasants whose own
development was restricted by West Pakistani
colonial policy. In this way the language move-
ments coLild expand into broader Bengali
Nationalism and lay the foundation for the
creation of a reformist nationalist party (the
Awami League) which successfully combined the
respective concerns of the larger rural petty
commodity producers and the urban petty
bourgeoisie to reproduce West Pakistani capital-
ism in the East through a constitutional
bourgeois-democratic transformation, with associ-
ated career prospects for the Bengali intelligentsia
in the private and public sectors. A combination
of populist rhetoric and rural vote banks (Ayoob
1971) steadily increased support among the
poorer classes of Bengali peasantry, culminating
in the League's overwhelming electoral victories
of 1970 and 1973.
Despite the contemporary significance of these
two classesjotedars and urban petty bourgeoisie
and the alliance between them, they remained
economically weak from 1947 to 1971 as a result
of East Bengal's status as a colony of West
Pakistan. This has been well documented else-
where by Nations (1971) and Sengupta (1971).
The Muslim League and the Movement for
Pakistan had been led essentially by classes
outside East Bengallandlords from Punjab,
Sind and Central India; trading communities
from Gujarat and Bombay which formed the
basis of the Pakistani industrial capitalist class;
and westernised Muslim elites from similar
regions who constituted a professional middle
class and who had staffed the bureaucratic and
military apparatuses of the colonial State. East
Bengal had been dominated by Hindu traders and
officials (as well as landlords) as part of the
Calcutta hinterland. Thus Muslims of East Bengal
were historically disadvantaged at the time of
Pakistan's formation in 1947. This facilitated
their colonial exploitation by the western region
up to 1971, and accounts for the restricted and
undeveloped nature of a bourgeois class
indigenous to East Bengal.
East Bengal had a virtual world monopoly in
jute production, but the foreign exchange earned
by the export of this peasant-produced cash crop
was redirected by the military-bureaucratic
oligarchy in West Pakistan (Alavi 1972) on behalf
of the development of its indigenous, industrial
capitalist class. The compulsory purchase of West
Pakistani manufactures by the East at inflated
monopoly prices led to a further outflow of
capital which might have been deployed locally.
Further aspects of this colonialism indirectly
restricted the development of the Bengali classes.
West Pakistani capital and its entrepreneurs were
significantly present and in control of East Bengal
industry, with Bengali Muslims owning less than
2.9 per cent of private industrial assets. Thus
much of the wealth created in East Bengal
industry was repatriated to the West in the form
of salaries, dividends, interests and profits; and
the related opportunity for multiplier effects from
41
indigenous capital accumulation was also lost.
Add to the picture the evidence from the First
and Second Five Year Plans, in particular, that
the greater proportion of funds for development
was allocated to the Western Province, and the
failure of an East Bengali bourgeoisie to emerge
is hardly surprising. The dominailt classes in
West Pakistan were engaged in an exercise of
primitive capital accumulation.
The development of social relations of production
in Bangladesh and the pattern of rural class
formation cannot be isolated from these colonial
effects. The principal contradiction was that the
appropriation of East Bengal's rural surplus by
the emerging capitalist classes of the West
(including an unwillingness to re-invest in East
Bengal's agriculture) jeopardised the reproduction
of social relations required to produce that
surplus. During the 1950s agricultural output
virtually stagnated (Bose 1973: 35; Government
of Bangladesh 1973: 84, passim). For example,
rice production increased at 0.7 per cent per
annum compared with a population growth of
nearly 3 per cent per annum. Even the production
of jute declined in the l950s, picking up in the
1960s only because of a large increase in the
acreage, since yields were declining. This evidence
on jute is consistent with the tendency for land-
holding to polarise, with land being transferred
out of the hands of small, mainly subsistence and
rice-cultivating peasants. The squeeze on agri-
culture, both through adverse terms of trade and
the low level of state investment, restricted the
capacity of richer peasants to expand their
control directly over productive assets. However,
this squeeze, together with increases in popula-
tion, increased the vulnerability of the poorest
peasants. Without the dubious advantages of a
zamindari system to rely on, their urgent require-
ments for credit, for land to sharecrop, or to
sell their labour could only be met by the richer,
surplus peasantsat a cost.
By thus restricting the development of rural
capitalism in East Bengal, Pakistani colonialism
encouraged the development of other relations
of exploitation: usurious moneylending often
related to the mortgaging of land; leasing of land
for sharecropping even where the owner's holding
is small and within the capacity of family labour;
and the use of hired labour, sometimes migratory,
at depressed wage rates (Alamgir 1974: 737-818;
Clay 1976). In addition to taking on the money-
lending functions of the 'deported' Hindu Banias,
the Muslim surplus peasants extended their
participation in petty trade, either diversifying
themselves into retail and marketing businesses in
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local hats (bazaars) and towns, or financing the
petty, peripatetic trading activities of the landless
and near-landless at usurious rates (Wood 1976).
Although the context is different, Patnaik's
analysis of the role of metropolitan capital in
structuring the transition from 'feudalism' in
India has many parallels for the East Bengal
colony (Patnaik 1972). Pakistan broke up East
Bengal's pre-capitalist economy but restricted
and distorted the development of capitalist
relations. She argues that under conditions of
manipulated stagnation by imperial exploitation
it is the 'antediluvian' forms of capital which
emerge and flourish: moneylending capital for
usury, trading capital, and capital for purchasing
land to lease out to petty tenants.
These 'antediluvian' forms of capital represent
capital in the sphere of exchange, and have to
be distinguished from capital in the sphere of
agricultural production which alone would be
consistent with the development of capitalist
social relations in the countryside. Thus under
these conditions the distortion of the pre-capitalist
mode of production does not necessarily entail
its substituticri by a capitalist mode.
This deveÏopment of capital in the sphere of
circulation of commodities with the related
'antediluvian' forms has the effect of under-
mining independent small peasant production.
There is an increase in landlessness and mort-
gaging. Indebtedness abounds and the small
peasants' land is gradually expropriated de facto
if not de jure so that the small peasant is trans-
formed into a sharecropper (of his own legal
holding); a dependent labourer and servant; an
insecure peripatetic trader carrying shoulder
loads; a migrant agricultural labourer; a hopeful
on the urban labour market; or a vagrant (Wood
1976). In these circumstances the extension of
wage labour cannot be interpreted as a sign of
advancing capitalist relations. Labour is free
neither in the sense of being unbonded, nor in
the sense of the availability of alternative
employment since the industrial development of
East Bengal was also restricted.
These exploitative relations are institutionally
disguised at the level of social relations in the
village, both consciously through verbal agree-
ments and informal arrangements backed by
sanctions; and more pervasively through the
class-based management of the hegemonic,
egalitarian Muslim kinship ideology which
denounces interest rates and the like.
But the specificity of agrarian conditions in East
Bengal goes beyond that derived from the status
of the province as a sub-colony of Pakistan
when the variations in rural class structure are
considered. The general effect of Pakistani
imperialism was not to produce a uniform set
of responses all over East Bengal, instead it was
articulated through the inherited regional differ-
ences iii social relations. Thus under the 'mini-
fundist' conditions of he Dacca-Comilla region
the relationships of debt and mortgage were the
dominant 'antediluvian' form to emerge; while
sharecropping and landlessness became more
prevalent in the West and North-West, where a
class of 'surplus' Muslim peasants was established
ii the form of larger landholder and petty
landlords. This is not to suggest that the other
forms of non-productive relation were not
present in each of the areas, but that the
variations above constituted the determining
relation in each case.
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